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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement activity is currently at its highest level since enactment of the statute in 1977.1 There were more enforcement actions brought in 2007 than in the years 
between 2004 and 2006 combined. Moreover, both the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the Department of Justice have made clear that FCPA enforcement is a top priority and they will be 
devoting all resources necessary to enforcing this statute.2 As noted by Attorney General Michael B. 
Mukasey, the DOJ alone brought 16 FCPA enforcement actions against individuals and corporations 
in 2007, including charges against seven individuals.3 “These 16 enforcement actions represent[ed] 
a 100 percent increase over the 8 enforcement actions brought in 2006, which was itself the largest 
total in the FCPA’s 30-year history.”4 The message is clear—the U.S. Government is committed to 
FCPA compliance and there is no evidence enforcement activity will slow any time soon. 
 Though it is difficult to identify one particular 
reason for this flurry of enforcement activity, it is 
likely this trend has been caused, at least in part, 
by the Government’s broad interpretation of the 
FCPA’s prohibitions and jurisdictional provisions. 
While many of the recent enforcement activities 
involve U.S. companies and their foreign subsid-
iaries, there has also been a substantial increase 
in the number of investigations and enforcement 
actions involving purely foreign concerns as well. 
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These actions demonstrate the Government’s in-
tent to push FCPA jurisdiction to its limits—even 
pursuing actions against foreign companies that 
have already been prosecuted by other foreign 
governments. In addition to the increasing risk 
for foreign-based companies, agency and repre-
sentative relationships remain at high risk for 
FCPA compliance problems. A sizeable number 
of recent enforcement actions have involved 
agents, representatives, or distributors running 
afoul of the FCPA’s antibribery prohibitions while 
they performed services in foreign countries. As 
a result, it is imperative that companies continue 
to keep a close eye on their intermediaries and 
ensure they have adequate internal controls in 
place. 
 While the rise in enforcement actions is a 
cause of great concern for most companies, these 
actions provide insight into the Government’s 
FCPA compliance expectations and its interpre-
tation of some of the Act’s more challenging 
provisions.5 Furthermore, the DOJ continues 
to offer guidance regarding FCPA compliance 
through its FCPA Opinion Procedure under 
which agency provides responses to specific 
inquiries submitted by companies concerning 
the legality of their conduct under the FCPA.6 
While the DOJ acknowledges this procedure has 
traditionally been an underutilized resource, 
the agency has made clear that it expects com-
panies to take advantage of the FCPA guidance 
provided in DOJ FCPA Opinions. As explained 
by Former Assistant Attorney General Alice 
Fisher, “it serves both [Government and busi-
ness] interests to avoid FCPA violations before 
they occur, and the opinion procedure is one 
way to make that happen.”7 
 Another likely cause of the recent upward 
trend in enforcement activity is the self-report-
ing of potential FCPA violations. A variety of 
factors, including the reporting requirements 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,8 the threat of 
fines and incarceration, and fear of irrevers-
ible reputational damage, have prompted many 
companies to voluntarily disclose potential FCPA 
violations. Although the Government continues 
to encourage disclosures and promises leniency 
in return, a review of enforcement actions over 
the past few years indicates this not necessarily 
the case. Recent voluntarily disclosed FCPA vio-
lations have been settled with enormous fines, 
lengthy prison terms, the imposition of corpo-
rate monitors, and, when settling with the SEC, 
the disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains. In fact, 
2007 saw Baker Hughes Inc. resolving its FCPA 
enforcement actions with the Government by 
agreeing to the largest monetary sanction ever 
imposed in an FCPA case totaling $44 million 
(a criminal fine totaling $11 million and a civil 
penalty and disgorgement totaling $33 million).9 
The size of this penalty makes it difficult to see 
how Baker Hughes received credit for its voluntary 
disclosure. Moreover, the Government continues 
to require the retention of independent compli-
ance monitors as a condition to settling enforce-
ment actions.10 While the Government contends 
that monitors are not a presumptive condition 
of settlement agreements,11 recent enforcement 
activity indicates otherwise. Corporate monitors 
are not only expensive, but, given the substantial 
latitude and vast powers afforded to monitors by 
the Government, they are also intrusive. Whether 
the significant costs associated with voluntary 
disclosures will curb the trend of self-reporting 
in the future remains to be seen. 
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 This Briefing Paper provides a general over-
view of the FCPA and guidance with respect to 
the more challenging provisions of the Act. It 
also highlights recent trends in FCPA enforce-
ment and compliance. Specifically, the Paper 
(a) provides a detailed discussion of the Act’s 
provisions, definitions of its key terms, and a 
guidance regarding the exception and affirma-
tive defenses to the antibribery prohibitions, 
(b) presents the bases for corporate liability un-
der the FCPA, including liability for the actions 
of intermediaries, employees, and subsidiaries 
or affiliates, (c) discusses the jurisdictional 
provisions of the Act in detail and highlights 
recent enforcement trends involving foreign 
entities, including parallel prosecutions, and 
(d) addresses the ongoing trend of self-report-
ing FCPA violations, the consequences of FCPA 
violations, and recent trends in the resolution 
of FCPA enforcement actions, including the 
frequent appointment of compliance monitors, 
and collateral or related litigation. 
FCPA Basics
 The FCPA has two components: (1) the an-
tibribery prohibitions and (2) the recordkeep-
ing and internal control provisions. The Act’s 
antibribery component prohibits payments to 
foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business.12 The Act’s books-and-records 
provisions require the maintenance of reasonably 
accurate accounting records and adequate internal 
controls.13 The plain language of the FCPA is less 
than clear, but its definitional sections, legislative 
history, relevant case law, enforcement actions, 
and the DOJ’s FCPA Opinions have helped to 
clarify the Act’s meaning. 
Antibribery Prohibitions
 The FCPA antibribery provisions, as amended 
in 1998,14 prohibit a company from corruptly 
offering or paying money or offering or giving 
anything of value, directly or indirectly through 
agents or intermediaries, to a foreign official 
to obtain or retain business.15 Specifically, the 
antibribery provisions prohibit:16
(1) Any act corruptly taken either through 
use the mails or of any instrumentality of 
■
interstate commerce or while in the terri-
tory of the United States,
(2) In furtherance of an offer, payment, prom-
ise to pay, or authorization of the payment 
of any money or offer, gift, promise to give, 
or authorization of the giving of anything 
of value to: 
(a) A foreign official;
(b) A foreign political party or official 
thereof; 
(c) A candidate for foreign political office; 
or 
(d) Any person, while knowing that all or 
a portion of such money or thing of 
value will be offered, given, or prom-
ised, directly or indirectly, to any of the 
above, 
(3) For the purposes of:
(a) Influencing any act or decision of such 
foreign official in his official capac-
ity; 
(b) Inducing such foreign official to do or 
omit to do any act in violation of the 
lawful duty of such official; 
(c) Securing any improper advantage; or 
(d)  Inducing such foreign official to use 
his influence with a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality thereof to af-
fect or influence any act or decision of 
such government or instrumentality, 
(4) In order to assist in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business 
to, any person.
FCPA Jurisdiction
 The FCPA applies to companies and persons 
based on either (a) the country in which the 
improper activity occurred (territorial-based 
jurisdiction) or (b) the origin of the party com-
mitting the act (nationality-based jurisdiction). 
Territorial jurisdiction covers persons or compa-
nies that commit an act within the territory of 
the United States “in furtherance of” a corrupt 
■
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payment or offer of payment, using the U.S. mails 
or other means or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce. “Territory of the United States” has 
been interpreted broadly, encompassing “all areas 
over which the United States asserts territorial 
jurisdiction.”17 In 1998, Congress amended the 
FCPA by expanding the “in furtherance of” re-
quirement, making clear that the requirement 
is not limited to actions that make use of the 
mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce.18 Rather, with respect to foreign 
companies and persons, the FCPA applies to any 
act taken within the United States that furthers 
the improper payment.19 Congress views “any act 
committed by a foreign national within the United 
States,” in furtherance of a bribe, to fall within 
its power to regulate “Commerce with foreign 
Nations.”20 All that is required for liability under 
the Act is that some conduct occur that facilitates 
or carries forward the prohibited activity. 
 Territorial jurisdiction applies to “issuers,” 
“domestic concerns,” and foreign companies 
and persons.21 An “issuer” is a U.S. or foreign 
company, or an officer, employee, agent or 
stockholder thereof, that either issues securities 
(or American Depositary Receipts) or must file 
reports with the SEC.22 A “domestic concern” 
is defined by the Act as any citizen, national or 
resident of the United States or any corporation 
or other business entity with its principal place of 
business in the United States or that is organized 
under the laws of a state of the United States.23 As 
part of its 1998 amendments, Congress extended 
the FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction to include non-
”issuer” foreign companies and individuals that 
commit an act in furtherance of the bribe while 
in the territory of the United States.24 National-
ity-based jurisdiction, applicable to domestic 
concerns and U.S. issuers, pertains to acts taken 
entirely outside the United States, as long as the 
act is in furtherance of the improper payment 
or offer, regardless of whether the U.S. mails or 
other means or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce are used.25 
FCPA Definitions & Standards
 The term “foreign official,” as defined by 
the FCPA, applies to officers or employees of 
a foreign government, including its depart-
■
ments, agencies and instrumentalities, public 
international organizations, or persons acting 
in an official capacity for or on behalf of these 
entities.26 A review of U.S. Government enforce-
ment actions demonstrates that the Government 
interprets “foreign official” broadly, including 
advisors to foreign officials, foreign political 
parties and their officials, candidates for public 
office, and private corporations entrusted with 
quasi-governmental functions. Congress added 
the term “public international organization” to 
the definition of “foreign official” in 1998 to 
include officers or employees of such entities as 
the United Nations, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the Red Cross.27
 The antibribery component of the FCPA in-
cludes a prohibition against giving “anything of 
value” for an improper purpose.28 The phrase 
“thing of value” has been construed broadly and 
is not limited to money. There is no minimum 
value that must be met before the “thing of value” 
constitutes an improper gift. Examples include, 
but are not limited to stocks, travel expenses, 
entertainment, hospitality provided to a foreign 
official’s spouse or children, discounts on prod-
ucts or services, forgiveness of outstanding debt, 
donations to a charitable organization on behalf 
of the foreign official, or employing a foreign of-
ficial or the official’s relative. Generally, whether 
an item constitutes a “thing of value” depends 
on the subjective value attached by the particular 
recipient.29 In addition, because the Act also pro-
hibits the “offer,” “promise,” or “authorization” 
of payments of money or of gifts to an official, 
mere offers or promises to pay money or to give 
a thing of value in the future fall within the Act’s 
purview.30 
 Liability under the antibribery provisions at-
taches only if the improper payment or gift is 
made “corruptly,”31 meaning with an “evil motive 
or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the 
recipient.”32 This standard is met if the payment, 
gift, or offer is made for one of the four reasons 
expressly provided in the FCPA: (1) influencing 
any act or decision of the foreign official in his 
official capacity under circumstances where the 
official has discretion and the payment is given 
to influence the discretionary decision, (2) in-
ducing the foreign official to do or omit to do 
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any act in violation of the official’s lawful duty, 
(3) inducing the foreign official to use his influ-
ence with a foreign government or instrumentality 
to affect or influence any act or decision of the 
government or instrumentality, or (4) securing 
any improper advantage.33 The term “securing 
any improper advantage” applies to anything to 
which “the company concerned was not clearly 
entitled, for example, an operating permit for a 
factory which fails to meet the statutory require-
ments.”34 Since the FCPA prohibits offering, 
paying or giving, promising to pay or give, or 
authorizing to pay or give money or anything of 
value for any of these four reasons, FCPA liability 
may attach even if the corrupt act does not suc-
ceed in its purpose.35 
 The improper payment, gift, or offer must 
also be made to obtain or retain business.36 Like 
other terms in the Act, the phrase “obtaining or 
retaining” business has been construed broadly, 
applying to any improper payment or gift that 
is “intended to assist the payor, either directly 
or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business 
for some person.”37 As long as it can be demon-
strated that the payment could provide an unfair 
advantage over competitors and assist the payor 
in obtaining or retaining business, this element 
of the antibribery prohibition will be satisfied.38 
In other words, this standard is not limited to 
payments or gifts made in exchange for the 
award or renewal of contracts or other business 
opportunities with a foreign government. Rather, 
this standard may be satisfied under a variety 
of circumstances including the reduction of 
tax liability,39 preferential treatment during the 
customs process,40 and payments made to secure 
debt owed to a company.41
	 In regard to liability under the Act for payments 
or gifts to “any person,” i.e., a third party, “while 
knowing” that the payment or gift will be made, 
offered, or promised, directly or indirectly, to a 
foreign official for improper purposes,42 the FCPA 
does not require proof that the person making 
the payment or gift has actual knowledge of the 
improper activity. Rather, the “knowing” stan-
dard is satisfied if “(i) such person is aware that 
such person is engaging in such conduct, that 
such circumstance exists, or that such result is 
substantially certain to occur; or (ii) such person 
has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or 
that such result is substantially certain to occur.”43 
Moreover, “knowledge is established if a person 
is aware of a high probability of the existence of 
such circumstance, unless the person actually 
believes that such circumstance does not exist.”44 
While Congress has made clear that negligence 
does not form the basis for liability, the Act does 
encompass circumstances under which a person 
acts in conscious disregard, willful blindness, or delib-
erate ignorance of circumstances that should alert 
one to the likelihood of an FCPA violation.45 
The Exception & Affirmative Defenses To  
 Antibribery Liability
 The FCPA contains a limited exception to 
the anti-bribery prohibitions for “facilitating” 
(sometimes referred to as “grease”) payments. 
Specifically, the Act does not apply “to any fa-
cilitating payment or expediting payment to a 
foreign official, political party, or party official 
the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure 
the performance of a routine governmental ac-
tion.”46 The purpose of the exception is to allow 
companies to make payments to foreign officials 
to speed up the performance of “non-discretion-
ary, ministerial activities performed by mid- or 
low-level foreign functionaries.”47
	 The Act limits the term “routine governmental 
action” to actions that are ordinarily and commonly 
performed by a foreign official in “(i) obtaining 
permits, licenses, or other official documents 
to qualify a person to do business in a foreign 
country; (ii) processing governmental papers, 
such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing 
police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or 
scheduling inspections associated with contract 
performance or inspections related to transit of 
goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, 
power and water supply, loading and unloading 
cargo, or protecting perishable products or com-
modities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a 
similar nature.”48 “Routine governmental actions” 
do not encompass decisions made by foreign of-
ficials to award new business to or to continue 
business with a particular party.49
 This exception for “facilitating” payments 
has been construed narrowly, and it is often 
difficult for companies to determine whether 
■
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certain payments qualify under it. As a result, 
companies should use great caution and carefully 
scrutinize proposed transactions when seeking 
to justify payments under this exception.
 In addition to the exception for “facilitating” 
payments, the FCPA provides two affirmative 
defenses to liability under the antibribery prohi-
bitions for payments or gifts to foreign officials 
that were (1) lawful under the written laws and 
regulations of the foreign official’s country or 
(2) “reasonable and bona fide” expenditures 
incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official 
“directly related” to the promotion, demonstra-
tion, or explanation of products or services or 
the execution or performance of a contract with 
a foreign government or agency.50 
 With respect to the first affirmative defense, a 
payment may only qualify under this provision if 
it is expressly authorized under the written laws 
or regulations of the foreign country. Indirect 
references in the law, such as a tax deduction for 
improper payments, do not qualify under this 
defense. Moreover, this defense is rarely available 
because such payments are seldom permitted 
under the local laws of most countries. 
 The second affirmative defense to the antibrib-
ery provisions of the FCPA permits payments or 
gifts incurred in connection with the promotion 
or demonstration of company products or ser-
vices or with the execution of a contract with a 
foreign government. This “promotional expenses” 
defense permits U.S. companies to pay “reason-
able and bona fide” expenses associated with a 
foreign official’s visit to the United States, as long 
as they are directly related to the promotion or 
demonstration of a product or the performance 
of a government contract. The application of 
this affirmative defense has caused problems for 
companies in the past. Companies often have 
trouble determining the extent to which a for-
eign official’s expenses may be covered. Several 
recent FCPA enforcement actions have provided 
companies with additional guidance regarding 
the use of this affirmative defense. 
 In December 2007, Lucent Technologies Inc. 
settled FCPA charges with the SEC and the DOJ 
for improper payments related to “promotional 
expenses” for Chinese government officials.51 
This enforcement action demonstrates the type 
of conduct that is outside the scope of the “pro-
motional expenses” affirmative defense. Lucent 
spent more than $10 million sponsoring trips 
for Chinese government officials. The trips con-
sisted of primarily sightseeing to locations such 
as Disneyland, Universal Studios, and the Grand 
Canyon, and in cities such as Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Las Vegas, Washington, D.C., and New 
York City. The trips typically lasted 14 days each 
and cost between $25,000 and $55,000 per trip. 
Lucent also provided between $500 and $1,000 
per day to the traveling foreign officials as a “per 
diem.” The trips were approved by senior Lucent 
Officials and improperly recorded in the company’s 
books and records. Specifically, the trips were 
primarily characterized in the company’s books 
and records as “factory inspections” or “training” 
in relation to contracts with its Chinese govern-
ment customers even though the trips involved 
little business content. While the facts clearly 
indicate a violation of the FCPA’s antibribery 
prohibitions, the Government charged Lucent 
only with violating the Act’s books-and-records 
and internal control provisions (discussed below) 
for improperly recording expenses and failing 
to maintain an adequate system of internal con-
trols. 
 Similarly, in October 2007, Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
Ltd.’s Italian affiliate settled fraud and FCPA 
charges after, among other improper activities, 
it sponsored eight officials from the Iraqi Oil 
Ministry to spend two days touring a manufac-
turing facility in Italy and an additional two days 
“on holiday” touring Florence at the company’s 
expense.52 The officials were also given $8,000 
in “pocket money.” Not only were these activities 
excluded from the purview of the affirmative 
defense, the company also violated the books-
and-records and internal control provisions 
of the FCPA by failing to properly record the 
payments in its books and records (referring to 
the payments under a general ledger account as 
“cost of sales deferred”). Delta & Pine Land Co. 
and its subsidiary, Turk Deltapine, Inc., also ran 
afoul of the FCPA’s antibribery and books-and-
records provisions.53 On July 25 and 26, 2007, the 
SEC filed two settled enforcement proceedings 
against the company, alleging that from 2001 to 
2006, Turk Deltapine made payments valued at 
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approximately $43,000 (including cash, payment 
of travel and hotel expenses, air conditioners, 
computers, office furniture, and refrigerators) to 
multiple officials of the Turkish Ministry of Agri-
cultural and Rural Affairs to obtain governmental 
reports and certifications that were necessary for 
Turk Deltapine to operate its business in Turkey.	
In settling with the SEC, Delta & Pine and Turk 
Deltapine jointly agreed to pay a $300,000 civil 
penalty.
 The enforcement action against Paradigm B.V. 
provides another example of conduct that falls 
outside the scope of the “promotional expenses” 
affirmative defense.54 On September 24, 2007, 
Paradigm settled an FCPA enforcement action 
with the DOJ related to improper payments made 
to government officials in China, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Mexico, and Nigeria. Among other 
allegations, the DOJ contended that Paradigm paid 
travel and entertainment expenses for officials 
of government-owned oil companies in China, 
including “training” trips in connection with busi-
ness opportunities with the Chinese government. 
The “training” trip expenses included airfare, 
hotel, meals, gifts, cash per diems, and entertain-
ment—including sightseeing and cash payments 
for shopping. The total amount of the payments 
could not be determined from the company’s 
documentation. Paradigm admitted to similar 
conduct in Mexico, including sponsoring the trip 
of a Mexican government official employed by the 
Mexican national oil company (Pemex) to Napa 
Valley, California for “relationship building and 
client development.” The trip, which involved 
visits to wineries and dinners and coincided with 
the Pemex official’s birthday, cost approximately 
$12,000 total for all attendees. Paradigm Mexico 
also spent approximately $10,000 entertaining the 
same Pemex government official by paying for his 
dinners, drinks, and other activities. Paradigm’s 
deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ 
required the company to pay a $1 million pen-
alty, implement rigorous internal controls, retain 
outside compliance counsel, and cooperate fully 
with the Department. 
 Other lessons may be derived from recent DOJ 
FCPA Opinions that explain the proper way in 
which to handle the expenses associated with 
visits from foreign officials so that the activity is 
covered by the affirmative defense.55 The DOJ 
Opinions’ discussion of the factual scenarios 
provided by requesters provides insight into the 
type of contemplated conduct covered by this 
affirmative defense. For example:
(1) Companies should avoid financing the trip 
of an official’s spouse, family, or any guests 
of the official.56 
(2) Any unnecessary upgrades to transporta-
tion or lodging should be avoided.57 
(3) Payments should be made directly to a ser-
vice provider and not directly to or through 
the foreign official.58 
(4) Expenditures should be closely tailored to 
the purpose of the trip, with reasonable 
estimates of the costs established before 
the official’s trip.59 
(5) Companies should avoid providing officials 
with large sums of spending or “pocket 
money” or providing extravagant enter-
tainment for the officials during promo-
tional trips.60 
(6) While a modest meals and entertainment 
(e.g., a brief sightseeing tour) may be 
permissible, most other forms of entertain-
ment should be covered by the officials 
themselves.61 
(7) Any souvenirs that the requestor may pro-
vide to the officials may only be of nominal 
value.62
(8) Reimbursement of modest expenses in-
curred by a foreign official may be made 
only upon presentation of a written re-
ceipt.63
(9) Companies should be careful not to select 
the particular government officials they 
will be hosting for the demonstration. 
This decision should be made solely by the 
foreign government.64
(10) Before the trip, a company should obtain 
written assurance from an established law 
firm with offices in both the United States 
and the foreign country that the sponsor-
ship of the visit and its payment of the 
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expenses is not contrary to the law of the 
foreign country.65 
(11) All costs and expenses incurred by the 
company in connection with the visit must 
be accurately recorded in the company’s 
books and records.66 
This guidance demonstrates that the affirmative 
defense for promotional expenses is narrow in 
scope and any such expenditures must be directly 
related to a legitimate business purpose. 
Recordkeeping & Internal Control Provisions
 In addition to the antibribery provisions, the 
FCPA contains a section requiring issuers of 
publicly traded securities to maintain internal 
accounting and recordkeeping controls suf-
ficient to provide reasonable assurance that its 
financial statements are accurate.67 This section 
works in tandem with the antibribery provisions 
and prohibits companies from using improperly 
recorded transactions or “off-the-book” accounts 
as a means of furthering and concealing improper 
payments to foreign officials. 
 The jurisdictional provisions of this section are 
far less extensive than those pertaining to bribery, 
covering only “issuers” (domestic and foreign 
companies) that have a class of securities regis-
tered pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l and entities 
that must file reports with the SEC pursuant to 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78o(d).68 The recordkeeping provisions 
do not extend to individuals or companies that 
do not meet these requirements, regardless of 
their nationality. Generally, the Act’s books-and-
records requirements mandate the maintenance 
of records and accounts that “accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions 
of the assets of the issuer.”69 In addition to these 
recordkeeping requirements, this section of the 
Act requires issuers to “devise and maintain a sys-
tem of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances” transactions are 
(a) executed with the authorization of company 
management, (b) recorded in a manner that per-
mits the maintenance of accountability of assets 
and the preparation of financial statements in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, (c) restricted so that assets may be 
accessed only with direct authorization of com-
■
pany management, and (d) reconciled properly 
so that asset documentation is checked against 
actual assets in reasonable intervals to permit the 
resolution of any discrepancies.70 
 The FCPA’s recordkeeping requirements are 
based on a concept of reasonableness, rather 
than materiality, and include all original docu-
ments (including invoices, receipts, accounting 
records, and expense reports), regardless of the 
dollar amount involved in the specific transac-
tion. Notably, the provisions are not limited 
to illegal or improper payments. Rather, they 
apply to all payments documented by a com-
pany—regardless of the size of the transaction. 
This means the Government may prosecute a 
company for violating the books-and-records 
provisions, even in the absence of a separate 
violation of the antibribery provisions. Moreover, 
an intentional violation of the books-and-records 
provisions may result in criminal liability.71 
Because the antibribery and recordkeeping 
provisions of the FCPA apply separately, an 
intentional violation of the accounting provi-
sions may constitute a criminal offense “whether 
or not such falsification is related to a foreign 
corrupt practice proscribed by the FCPA.”72 
The SEC has taken action against companies 
under the recordkeeping provisions of the Act, 
even when there was insufficient evidence to 
establish a separate antibribery violation. 
 For example, in an enforcement action against 
Schering-Plough Corp., the SEC charged the 
company with violating the recordkeeping and 
internal control provisions of the FCPA in connec-
tion with payments made by its Polish subsidiary 
to a charity associated with a Polish government 
official.73 The SEC found that the company made 
the payments for the purpose of influencing the 
official to persuade the Polish government to 
purchase Schering-Plough’s products. Although 
the DOJ never charged the company with violat-
ing the antibribery provisions of the FCPA, the 
SEC charged the company with violating the 
books-and-records provisions, finding that the 
company failed to properly record the payments. 
In addition, the SEC also found the company vio-
lated the internal control provisions of the FCPA 
because its system of internal controls failed to 
detect or prevent the improper payments. 
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 In 2007, Lucent Technologies Inc. also settled 
an enforcement action related to its books-and-
records and internal controls. Specifically, Lucent 
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement 
with the DOJ and settled a civil action with the 
SEC regarding its failure to (1) properly ac-
count in its books and records for the travel and 
entertainment expenditures made on behalf of 
Chinese officials and (2) implement sufficient 
internal controls to prevent the improper activ-
ity.74 Though the allegations discussed improper 
expenditures involving government officials, this 
was a books-and-records case.
 These enforcement actions demonstrate the 
importance of a company’s compliance with the 
FCPA’s recordkeeping and internal control re-
quirements. If a company cannot openly record 
a transaction in its books and records because of 
its questionable nature, it should not go forward 
with the transaction. 
Bases For Liability
Liability For The Actions Of Intermediaries
 The antibribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit 
more than direct payments or gifts to foreign 
officials. Rather, as noted earlier in this Paper, 
the Act encompasses payments or gifts made to 
a third party while knowing that the money or 
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, 
directly or indirectly, to any foreign official.75 
This means that FCPA liability attaches regard-
less of whether the payment is made directly to 
the foreign official or through an intermediary 
such as a third-party agent, consultant, joint 
venture partner, representative, or distributor. 
The high risks associated with the intermediary 
relationship require that companies conduct 
thorough, well-documented due diligence when 
hiring international agents to conduct business 
in a foreign country. Companies should have a 
thorough due diligence plan in place to vet all 
agents hired to perform work in foreign countries 
to make certain that the company is entering 
into business relationships with reputable and 
qualified partners only. 
 To ensure consistency when conducting due 
diligence, a company should have express pro-
■
cedures for the hiring and vetting of foreign 
intermediaries, including written standards for 
the selection of intermediaries. The due diligence 
should, at a minimum, verify (a) whether the po-
tential intermediary is qualified for the position, 
(b) the number of years the intermediary has 
been in operation, (c) the size and	adequacy of 
the intermediary’s support staff and geographi-
cal coverage, (d) the intermediary’s personal or 
professional ties to the foreign government or 
government officials, (e) a profile of the interme-
diary’s current clientele, (f) its reputation with 
the U.S. embassy or consulate or other businesses 
that it deals with on a regular basis, and (g) its 
familiarity with and	willingness to adhere to the 
FCPA.76 To tailor an effective compliance program 
to the particular circumstances, the reputation 
of the country in which the intermediary will be 
acting should also be considered when conduct-
ing due diligence. For example, if the agreement 
with the intermediary is to be performed in a 
country known for bribery activity, a company 
should employ heightened scrutiny when con-
ducting diligence. Once a company selects an 
intermediary, the selection should be reviewed 
in writing, along with all related agreements and 
payments.77
 In addition, the language of the agreement ex-
ecuted between a company and a foreign agent is 
crucial. While the FCPA does not expressly address 
the contents of agency agreements, the Govern-
ment will review an agreement’s provisions to see 
if the company took necessary precautions before 
entering into this type of high-risk agreement. The 
DOJ has provided some guidance with respect to 
contents of a proper agency agreement:78 
(1) A representation by the intermediary that 
it will not pay or agree to pay, directly or 
indirectly, any funds or anything of value, 
on behalf of the company, to any public of-
ficial in the foreign country for the purpose 
of influencing the official’s official acts or 
to induce the official to use his influence 
to the intermediary’s benefit.79
(2) A provision allowing for internal and inde-
pendent audits of the books and records 
of the intermediary to ensure compliance 
with the FCPA.80 
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(3) A statement that if the intermediary vio-
lates the FCPA or any other provision of the 
agreement, the agreement will automati-
cally be rendered void ab initio, the inter-
mediary will automatically surrender any 
claim for payment under the agreement 
even for sales previously concluded or sales 
previously rendered, and the company will 
have the right, when required, to disclose 
the agreement, alleged improper activity, 
and amount of commission applicable to 
the particular agreement to the U.S. Gov-
ernment and the foreign government in 
which any improper activity took place.81 
(4) A statement that the intermediary will be 
solely responsible for all of its costs and 
expenses incurred in connection with 
its representation of the company, un-
less responsibility is assumed in writing 
in advance with a detailed itemization of 
expenses. All purchase orders and autho-
rizations must be in writing.82 
(5) A representation that neither the agent 
nor any of its company representatives is a 
government official, an official of a politi-
cal party, a candidate for political office, 
a consultant to a government official, or 
affiliated with a government official and 
that none of them will become an official 
of the foreign government during the term 
of the agreement.83
(6) Confirmation that the agreement is lawful 
in the foreign country in which it is to be 
performed.84
(7) A prohibition on assignment or novation 
of the agreement without prior written 
consent.85
 While these express provisions are necessary 
to protect the interests of a company that has 
formed a relationship with a foreign official, 
execution and monitoring of the agreement are 
equally important.86 Companies should have tight 
internal controls and monitoring procedures in 
place to supervise the activities of the foreign 
intermediary and any payments made to the 
intermediary for work it has conducted on the 
company’s behalf.87 Moreover, companies should 
clearly articulate their corporate procedures in 
writing and assess the quality of their internal 
controls on a regular basis to ensure that they 
have effective FCPA compliance procedures in 
place.88 
 Companies with overseas agents should also 
develop and implement both an ethics policy 
and a separate FCPA policy. The latter should 
provide a brief overview of the FCPA bribery 
provisions, present examples of prohibited activi-
ties, and contain a statement making clear the 
company’s commitment to FCPA compliance. All 
company employees should receive a copy of the 
policies and execute a certification stating that 
the employee both has read the policies and will 
strictly comply with their provisions. Moreover, 
all company employees involved in the selection 
and monitoring of foreign agents should receive 
extensive FCPA training and be kept abreast of 
developments in this area of the law. A culture 
of FCPA compliance may both prevent FCPA 
violations and prepare a company in case FCPA 
issues arise. 
 The combination of effective due diligence, 
internal controls, training, and monitoring of 
all agreements with intermediaries is necessary 
to help a company identify the “red flags” associ-
ated with FCPA violations, including suspicious or 
unnecessary representatives and intermediaries, 
conducting business in bribery-prone countries, 
requests for cash payments, excessive consulting 
fees or commissions or unusual payment patterns 
or financial arrangements, a refusal by prospec-
tive intermediary to certify compliance with the 
FCPA, reimbursement requests for inadequately 
documented expenses, sales to government-
sponsored companies, lack of transparency in 
expenses and accounting records, and evidence 
of close personal or professional ties to a foreign 
official.89
Liability For The Actions Of Employees
 A company can be held vicariously liable for an 
employee’s violation of the FCPA. Under such cir-
cumstances, a “corporation may be held criminally 
responsible for . . . [improper activity]…committed 
by its employees [or agents] if they were acting 
within the scope of their authority, or apparent 
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authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, 
even if…such acts were against corporate policy 
or express instructions.”90 To impose liability on 
a corporation, the employee or agent’s improper 
activities need only be motivated in part by intent 
to benefit the corporation.91 
 Even if the conduct is not expressly authorized, 
there is a high risk of liability for a company if 
an employee violates the FCPA while acting, at 
least in part, on behalf of the company. Under 
these circumstances, the Government is likely to 
take action against both the company and the 
responsible employees. In fact, the SEC and the 
DOJ will often take action against employees who 
are viewed as most responsible for a company’s 
FCPA violation.	
 For example, in May 2008, Willbros Group, 
Inc. announced that it would pay $32.3 mil-
lion in penalties and disgorgement to resolve 
FCPA violations relating to its operations in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nigeria.92 In addition 
to the company’s settlement with the SEC 
and deferred prosecution agreement with the 
DOJ, the Government brought charges against 
company employees and officers responsible 
for the improper conduct. Specifically, on July 
23, 2007, the DOJ announced the indictment 
of a former executive of a Willbros subsidiary, 
Jason Edward Steph.93 The Government charged 
Steph with conspiring to make over $6 million 
in improper payments to Nigerian officials and 
with money laundering based on the interna-
tional transfer of some of the bribe money. The 
Government also filed similar charges against 
Jim Bob Brown, a former Willbros executive 
who participated in three separate schemes to 
bribe foreign officials.94 Brown pleaded guilty 
to the charges brought by the DOJ and entered 
into an agreement with the SEC to be enjoined 
from future violations for the FCPA. Other 
examples of the Government’s heightened 
pursuit of responsible employees and execu-
tives include Si Chan Wooh of Schnitzer Steel 
Industries Inc.,95 Steven Lynwood Head of Titan 
Corp.,96 and David Kay, Douglas Murphy, and 
Lawrence H. Theriot of American Rice, Inc.97 
These enforcement actions against both the 
companies and their employees demonstrate 
the Government’s willingness to pursue dual 
actions against corporations and responsible 
individuals for their violations of the FCPA. 
Liability For The Actions Of Subsidiaries Or  
 Affiliates
 In addition to liability based on the actions of its 
employees, companies may be held liable for the 
acts of their subsidiaries or affiliates. Under the 
books-and-records provisions of the FCPA, each 
issuer is responsible for the books and records of 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries and affiliates 
over which it holds greater than 50% of the voting 
power.98 Under these circumstances, companies 
must ensure their subsidiaries and affiliates com-
ply with the FCPA’s recordkeeping provisions.99 
If an issuer holds 50% or less of the voting power 
of a domestic or foreign subsidiary or affiliate, 
it is only required to demonstrate a good faith 
effort to use its influence to cause the subsidiary 
or affiliate to comply with the FCPA’s books-and- 
records provisions.100 The Act requires only that 
the company “use its influence, to the extent 
reasonable	under the issuer’s circumstances, to 
cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and 
maintain a system of internal accounting controls 
consistent with” the FCPA.101 The determination 
whether the company’s conduct is “reasonable 
under the issuer’s circumstances,” depends on 
several factors, “includ[ing] the relative degree 
of the issuer’s ownership of the domestic or for-
eign firm and the laws and practices governing 
the business operations of the country in which 
such firm is located.”102 
 While the FCPA expressly addresses liability 
for company subsidiaries and affiliates under 
the books-and-records provisions, there is no 
similar provision in the antibribery prohibi-
tions. Regardless, a company may still be held 
liable for a subsidiary or affiliate’s violation 
of the antibribery provisions if the company 
“authorized, directed, or controlled the activity 
in question.”103 Unlike the recordkeeping pro-
visions, a company’s holdings in the subsidiary 
or affiliate are not a primary consideration 
under the antibribery provisions. Instead, the 
Government looks to the degree of control the 
company has over the subsidiary or affiliate, 
and its level of knowledge and participation 
in the bribery scheme. 
■
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Increased Prosecution Of Foreign Compa-
nies & Nationals
	 Recent FCPA enforcement actions demonstrate 
that the U.S. Government is not hesitant to ex-
ercise its jurisdiction under the Act over foreign 
entities based on their contacts with the United 
States or their status as “issuers.”104 There are a 
multitude of reasons for the rise in foreign en-
forcement activity, including the globalization of 
the marketplace, increased international merger 
and acquisition activity, and a rise in voluntary 
disclosures of potential FCPA violations to U.S. 
authorities. Irrespective of the cause for this in-
crease in activity, the U.S. Government has made 
clear its intention to take action against foreign 
companies that violate the FCPA. As noted by 
Alice S. Fisher, former Assistant Attorney General, 
the DOJ “will not hesitate to enforce the FCPA 
against foreign-owned companies, just as it does 
against American companies.”105 
 While enforcement activity involving the for-
eign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies has 
been prevalent for quite some time, since 2004 
there has been a steady increase in the number 
of FCPA investigations involving purely foreign 
companies. For example, in December 2007, Akzo 
Nobel N.V., a Netherlands-based pharmaceutical 
company that trades ADRs, settled an enforcement 
action with the SEC in relation to its violations of 
the FCPA’s recordkeeping and internal control 
provisions.106 According to the SEC’s complaint, 
two of Akzo Nobel’s subsidiaries made $279,491 
in improper payments in connection with sales 
in Iraq under the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program. 
The subsidiaries characterized the payments as 
“after-sales service fees,” though no legitimate 
services were performed. In settling with the 
SEC, Akzo Nobel agreed to pay a $750,000 pen-
alty (plus $584,150 in prejudgment interest) and 
disgorge $1,647,363 in profits. Akzo Nobel also 
entered into a nonprosecution agreement with 
the DOJ.
 Similarly, in 2006, Statoil ASA, a Norwegian 
oil and gas company that trades ADRs on the 
New York Stock Exchange, settled enforcement 
actions with the SEC and the DOJ in connection 
with payments totaling $5.2 million to the head 
of the Iranian Fuel Consumption Optimizing 
Organization, a subsidiary of the National Iranian 
Oil Company, through an offshore intermediary 
company consultant.107 The consultant made 
the payments in an attempt to persuade the of-
ficial to use his influence to secure an oil and 
gas field contract for Statoil. In settling with the 
DOJ, Statoil entered into a three-year deferred 
prosecution agreement and agreed to pay $10.5 
million in disgorgement. In its SEC settlement, 
Statoil consented to the entry of an administra-
tive order requiring the company to cease and 
desist from committing any future violations of 
the FCPA, agreed to pay $10.5 million in dis-
gorgement, and agreed to retain a compliance 
monitor for three years. The company also paid 
a fine to the Norway National Authority for In-
vestigation and Prosecution of Economic Crime 
for the same activity—an amount deducted from 
the U.S. fines. 
 Likewise, on March 20, 2008, AB Volvo, a Swed-
ish company, settled its enforcement actions with 
the SEC and the DOJ in connection with improper 
activity involving the Oil For Food Program.108 Two 
of its subsidiaries, Renault Trucks SAS (France) and 
Volvo Construction Equipment AB(Switzerland), 
also settled charges of engaging in conspiracies to 
commit wire fraud and to violate the books-and-
records provisions of the FCPA. The settlements 
included fines, disgorgement, and interest total-
ing about $19.6 million. Similarly, as noted above, 
Paradigm, B.V., a company headquartered in the 
Netherlands, also settled an FCPA enforcement 
action in 2007 in connection with improper pay-
ments made to officials in China, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Indonesia, and Kazakhstan.109 The company entered 
into a deferred prosecution agreement with the 
DOJ, agreeing to pay a $1 million fine, retain an 
independent compliance monitor, and adopt more 
stringent compliance controls. Notably, Paradigm 
relocated its principal place of business from Israel 
to the United States in 2005, changing its status to 
a “domestic concern,” though the DOJ took pre-
relocation improper activity into account in this 
matter. 
 The Government has also shown an increased 
interest in prosecuting foreign nationals under the 
FCPA. In March 2007, the DOJ indicted Christian 
Sapsizian, a French citizen, and former executive 
of French telecommunications Alcatel CIT.110 
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Sapsizian pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA 
by making more than $2.5 million in improper 
payments to Costa Rican government officials 
to obtain a telecommunications contract. The 
Government also indicted Edgar Valverde Acosta, 
a Costa Rican national and Senior Country Of-
ficer of Alcatel’s Costa Rican subsidiary, based in 
the same conduct.111 Another example involves 
a civil injunction filed by the SEC against four 
former employees of subsidiaries of ABB Ltd., a 
Swiss company that trades its ADRs on the New 
York Stock Exchange.112 The SEC complaint al-
leged that the four employees, John Samson, 
John G. A. Munro, Ian N. Campbell, and John 
H. Whelan, participated in a scheme to bribe 
Nigerian government officials in furtherance 
of ABB’s bid to obtain a government contract 
to provide equipment for an oil drilling proj-
ect. Samson, Munro, and Campbell are British 
citizens, while Whelan is a U.S. citizen. All four 
were alleged to have violated both the antibrib-
ery and books-and-records and internal control 
provisions of the FCPA. Likewise, in September 
2007, the SEC settled a civil enforcement action 
against Chandramowli Srinivasan, a resident of 
Delhi, India and the former president of A.T. 
Kearney India, a subsidiary of Electronic Data 
Systems Corp. at the time.113 The complaint al-
leged that Srinivasan directed at least $720,000 
in illicit payments to senior employees of Indian 
state-owned enterprises to retain its business with 
those enterprises. On a neither admit-nor-deny 
basis, the SEC ordered Srinivasan to pay a $70,000 
penalty.
 While there have only been a handful of purely 
foreign companies and nationals that have settled 
FCPA enforcement actions, dozens of foreign 
companies have recently disclosed potential viola-
tions of the FCPA and are currently under inves-
tigation for the improper activity, including “ABB 
(Switzerland, energy); Alcatel Lucent (France, 
communications); AstraZeneca (UK-Sweden, 
pharmaceuticals); BAE Systems (UK, defence); 
Daimler (Germany, automotive); Innospec (UK, 
chemicals); Magyar Telekom (Hungary, telecoms); 
Norsk Hydro (Norway, energy); Novo Nordisk 
(Denmark, health, pharmaceuticals); Panalpina 
(Switzerland, transport); Siemens (Germany, 
engineering, electronics); Smith & Nephew (UK, 
medical devices); Total (France, energy).”114
 Another trend that has arisen with respect 
to the prosecution of foreign companies and 
nationals is parallel prosecutions and investiga-
tions. FCPA enforcement is just one weapon in 
an arsenal of international agreements enacted 
to combat bribery throughout the world, includ-
ing the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Inter-American Conven-
tion Against Corruption, United Nations Con-
vention Against Corruption, and the African 
Union Convention on Preventing and Combat-
ing Corruption. Recent enforcement activity 
and investigations indicate that disclosure to 
foreign officials and a full investigation of a 
firm by foreign prosecutors does not preclude 
U.S. authorities from pursuing a matter. Rather, 
coordination between the United States and 
foreign authorities has resulted in an increase 
in the number of joint investigations and FCPA 
enforcement actions. 
 Of course, even if a foreign prosecutor declines 
to pursue allegations of bribery, the U.S. is still 
likely to act if it has jurisdiction over the matter. 
For example, as discussed earlier, in 2006, Statoil 
ASA, a Norwegian company, settled an FCPA 
enforcement action with the DOJ by agreeing 
to pay $21 million—half as a fine payable to the 
DOJ and half as disgorgement and prejudgment 
interest to the SEC. The DOJ pursued the case 
even though Statoil had already been investigated 
and fined $3 million by Norwegian authorities 
for the same improper activity.115 Similarly, in 
its announcement of a deferred prosecution 
agreement with Akzo Nobel for its violation of 
the FCPA, the DOJ noted that the Dutch Na-
tional Public Prosecutor’s Office for Financial, 
Economic, and Environmental Offences was 
also investigating an Akzo subsidiary regarding 
its conduct under the Oil for Food Program, 
and it was expected the company would pay a 
criminal fine of approximately €381,000 in the 
Netherlands.116 Under the agreement with the 
DOJ, failure to resolve the charges with Dutch 
officials would require Akzo to pay $800,000 to 
the U.S. Treasury.
 The United States is also currently investigating 
allegations into Siemens AG’s potential violations of 
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the FCPA.117 Some estimates indicate the company 
has uncovered over $1.9 billion in questionable 
payments. It is expected the investigation will 
potentially result in the largest fines in history,118 
despite the fact that Siemens has already paid 
fines ordered by German courts totaling over 
$290 million (based on related charges).119 The 
company has also reportedly spent over $500 
million on its internal investigation into the 
improper activity.120 Similar investigations into 
Siemens’ improper activity are taking place in 
over 10 different countries and German courts 
are currently prosecuting individuals responsible 
for the corrupt activity. In July 2008, German 
authorities announced a criminal verdict of 
breach of trust against Reinhard Siekaczek for 
his role in funneling €49 million ($77 million) 
into slush funds for bribes to help win contracts 
for the company.121
  A parallel prosecution that has received 
enormous publicity involves BAE Systems, PLC. 
The United States is investigating allegations of 
improper activity related to BAE’s £40 billion Al 
Yamamah arms contract with Saudi Arabia.122 The 
British Serious Fraud Office closed its inquiry 
into the matter in 2006, but the DOJ continued 
with its inquiry based on, among other reasons, 
reports that the company spent £1.1 million in 
Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and New York to cover 
the cost of hotels, security, transportation, and 
other expenses for visiting senior Saudi offi-
cials.123 In its investigation into the allegations 
against BAE, the United States has coordinated 
its investigative efforts with Swiss authorities who 
have agreed to provide relevant financial records 
to assist the DOJ’s investigation.124 On July 30, 
2008, the House of Lords, the United Kingdom’s 
highest court, overruled a lower court finding 
that the Serious Fraud Office had improperly 
closed the investigation into the bribery allega-
tions.125 Despite finding that the Serious Fraud 
Office acted lawfully in closing its investigation, 
the court’s ruling is unlikely to deter the U.S. 
investigation into this matter. 
 Given the U.S. authorities’ intent to aggres-
sively pursue foreign companies that violate the 
FCPA, it is imperative that any foreign company 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction take all necessary steps 
to ensure compliance with the law. 
Voluntary Disclosures & The Costs Of  
Violating The FCPA
Trend Of Voluntarily Disclosing FCPA  
 Violations
 Most FCPA investigations and enforcement ac-
tions today are prompted by voluntary disclosures 
of potential violations. While companies are not 
required by law to voluntarily disclose potential 
FCPA violations, they usually do so based on legal, 
financial, and reputational considerations. The 
primary reason for the dramatic increase in the 
number of FCPA investigations and enforcement 
actions is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.126 Under 
Sarbanes-Oxley, companies must do more than 
tighten their internal controls and verify the ac-
curacy of accounts and financial statements; they 
must also identify any “material weaknesses” that 
affect the internal controls, including potential 
improper activity, and address these matters 
within a reasonable time. Sarbanes-Oxley also 
imposes increased obligations on companies to 
disclose potential liabilities to shareholders—a 
requirement that encourages companies to be 
forthcoming about potential FCPA violations as 
well. In addition to the influence of Sarbanes-
Oxley, there has been a general trend in FCPA 
enforcement for companies to voluntarily disclose 
potential violations and to cooperate with U.S. 
officials in an attempt to achieve favorable treat-
ment and mitigate potential penalties. 
 Although the	Government claims it will reward 
companies that self-report improper activity, a 
review of recent enforcement actions demon-
strates that the SEC and the DOJ are still likely 
to impose harsh penalties on companies that 
voluntarily disclose FCPA violations. For example, 
in an enforcement action noted above, Willbros 
Group, Inc. announced in May 2008 that it would 
pay $32.3 million in penalties and disgorgement 
(a $22 million criminal penalty to the DOJ and 
$10.3 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest 
to the SEC) to resolve FCPA violations after the 
company self-reported the potential violations to 
the Government.127 Although the Government 
claimed that it considered Willbros’ voluntary 
disclosure in determining its penalty, it is difficult 
to discern exactly how the voluntary disclosure 
mitigated the penalty in this matter. Furthermore, 
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after Schnitzer Steel voluntarily disclosed a $1.9 
million improper payment, the Government fined 
the company $7.5 million in criminal penalties 
and $7.7 million in disgorgement.128 In contrast, 
after the Government learned of Statoil ASA’s 
$5.2 million in improper payments from Norwe-
gian newspapers, the U.S. Government fined the 
company $10.5 million in criminal penalties and 
$10.5 million in disgorgement of profit.129 A com-
parison of these two actions does not adequately 
demonstrate the benefit Schnitzer received from 
its voluntary disclosure. 
 The Government encourages the voluntary 
disclosure by parties that discover potential FCPA 
violations and, while declining to guarantee a 
specific outcome, contends a company will receive 
some benefit in return.130 To date, the Govern-
ment has neither clarified nor demonstrated 
what constitutes the “benefit” received in return 
for a complete disclosure and cooperation with 
Government investigations, but has stated that 
a voluntary disclosure will be considered by the 
government when determining a penalty.131 Former 
Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher explained 
the reason for the lack of clarity as follows:132 
[I]t would not make sense for law enforcement 
to make one-size-fits-all promises about the ben-
efits of voluntary disclosure before getting all of 
the facts.
 It also would not be in the best interests of 
law enforcement to make promises about lenient 
treatment in cases where the magnitude, dura-
tion, or high-level management involvement in 
the disclosed conduct may warrant a guilty plea 
and a significant penalty. But what I can say is that 
there is always a benefit to corporate cooperation, 
including voluntary disclosure….
 The fact is, if you are doing the things you 
should be doing—whether it is self-policing, self-
reporting, conducting proactive risk assessments, 
improving your controls and procedures, training 
on the FCPA, or cooperating with an investigation 
after it starts—you will get a benefit. It may not 
mean that you or your client will get a complete 
pass, but you will get a real, tangible benefit.
  There have been cases where companies have 
come in and voluntarily disclosed real FCPA viola-
tions that we have not prosecuted at all. On the 
other hand, in other cases a voluntary disclosure 
might result in a guilty plea, depending on the 
circumstances.
 So although nothing is off the table when you 
voluntarily disclose, I can tell you in unequivocal 
terms that you will get a real benefit— just like 
Schnitzer Steel did. As I said earlier, Schnitzer 
Steel was an excellent example of corporate co-
operation.
Despite the Government’s assurances that self-
reporting and cooperation will result in a tan-
gible benefit, recent enforcement trends do not 
reflect this promise. As a result, it remains to be 
seen whether companies will continue to choose 
voluntary disclosure as the preferred method of 
resolving FCPA violations. 
FCPA Enforcement Tools: Fines, Penalties &  
 Incarceration
	 The FCPA provides both criminal and civil 
penalties for the violation of its provisions. Pen-
alties for violations of the antibribery provisions 
include a fine of up to $2 million and a $10,000 
civil penalty for corporations and other business 
entities and a $10,000 civil penalty and a fine of 
up to $100,000 and five years’ imprisonment for 
willful violations for officers, directors, stockhold-
ers, employees, and agents (including non-U.S. 
nationals).133 Violations of the recordkeeping and 
internal control provisions are typically punished 
with civil penalties that range in size depending 
on the circumstances. Specifically, maximum 
civil penalties range from $5,000 to $100,000 
for an individual and $50,000 to $500,000 for an 
entity, or the gross amount of pecuniary gain.134 
Criminal violations of the books-and-records 
provisions carry a maximum penalty of a $25 
million fine for entities, a $5 million fine and 
20 years’ incarceration for persons, or twice the 
amount of pecuniary gain to the defendant or 
loss caused to anyone else.135 Further, under the 
”Sentence of Fine” statute, the actual fine may be 
up to twice the benefit that the defendant sought 
to obtain by making the corrupt payment.136 The 
Government also usually seeks disgorgement of 
any ill-gotten gains associated with the improper 
activity. 
 Beyond monetary and pecuniary penalties, the 
Government has a laundry list of administrative 
penalties that it can use against violators of the 
FCPA. For example, companies that do busi-
ness with the Government may be debarred or 
suspended from future Government contracting 
opportunities.137 Companies or persons may also 
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be deemed ineligible to receive export licenses, 
barred from trading securities, or prohibited from 
participating in other agency programs.138 
 There appears to be no consistent pattern to the 
determination of penalties associated with FCPA 
violations. While certain factors (e.g., the size of 
the bribe, the benefit a company receives from 
its improper activity, and prior FCPA violations) 
are likely to influence the penalty determination, 
the process lacks transparency. Still, the Govern-
ment has been aggressive in its punishment of 
FCPA violators and recent enforcement actions 
have resulted in the largest fines in FCPA history. 
In addition to Baker Hughes’ $44 million settle-
ment,139 other companies have been required to 
pay in the tens of millions to settle their FCPA 
cases. In May 2008, as described above, Willbros 
Group, Inc. announced that it would pay $32.3 
million in penalties and disgorgement to resolve 
FCPA violations relating to its operations in Bo-
livia, Ecuador, and Nigeria.140 The Government 
alleged that Willbros employees made corrupt 
payments totaling more than $6.3 million to 
Nigerian government officials to assist in obtain-
ing and retaining a $387 million contract. On 
November 14, 2007, Chevron Corp. agreed to pay 
a $30 million to settle FCPA charges that it made 
over $20 million in improper payments.141 Of the 
$30 million penalty Chevron paid to settle this 
matter, $25 million constituted disgorgement. 
Also, in March 2005, Titan paid $28.5 million (the 
pre-Baker Hughes fine recordholder) for bribes 
totaling $3.5 million.142 The Government claims 
it considers factors such as voluntary disclosure, 
cooperation, and FCPA compliance programs 
when determining how to penalize a company 
for violating the FCPA. It is not clear, however, 
how much these additional factors influence the 
penalty determination. 
Settlements, Nonprosecution/Deferred  
 Prosecution Agreements & Corporate Monitors
 Currently, most enforcement actions brought 
by the Government are resolved either by the ex-
ecution of a consent decree (SEC), a nonprosecu-
tion or deferred prosecution agreement (DOJ), 
or both. A typical nonprosecution or deferred 
prosecution agreement contains a promise by 
the Government to refrain from criminally pros-
■
ecuting a company in exchange for cooperation, 
changes in the corporate structure, continued 
compliance with the FCPA, and the payment 
of any fines or penalties imposed as a result of 
the improper activity. These agreements allow 
the Government to administer punishment and 
extract concessions while reserving the right to 
take action against the company at a later date 
should the company fail to follow through with 
its compliance obligations or if further violations 
are discovered. Because of the reputational dam-
age associated with a conviction, companies often 
prefer to resolve FCPA violations in this manner, 
though it is certainly arguable that most of the 
reputational damage has already occurred by the 
time an FCPA violation becomes public knowl-
edge. Even without a conviction, companies will 
still be subjected to negative press, reputational 
harm, and a potential loss of business as the result 
of public release of FCPA allegations. Still, this 
appears to be the preferred course of action for 
companies at this time. 
 The prevalence of these agreements has also 
resulted in another trend: the appointment of 
an independent compliance monitor as a condi-
tion to settlement. Monitors are retained at the 
company’s expense and are tasked with scrutiniz-
ing the company’s compliance with the FCPA for 
a specific period of time (typically two or three 
years). A review of recent enforcement actions 
suggests a trend of requiring monitors in most 
FCPA resolutions, regardless of the circumstances 
of a particular matter.143 The DOJ, however, con-
tends that various factors are considered when 
determining whether to require the appointment 
of a monitor, including “the strength of the 
company’s existing management and compliance 
team, the pervasiveness of the problem, and the 
strength of the company’s existing FCPA policies 
and procedures.”144
 Independent monitors are very expensive and 
companies are generally responsible for adopting 
the FCPA compliance recommendations sug-
gested by the monitor. Not only must a company 
pay for cost of the monitor’s services (typically 
at high hourly rates), but they must absorb the 
costs of implementing the compliance recom-
mendations—an undertaking that can be quite 
costly depending on the extent of the monitor’s 
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recommendations. In addition to monetary con-
siderations, independent monitors put a company 
at significant risk for the discovery and disclo-
sure of additional FCPA violations. Because the 
monitor is charged by the Government with filing 
regular reports on a company’s compliance with 
its recommendations and the FCPA in general, 
any improper activity or noncompliance that is 
discovered may have to be reported under the 
terms of a particular agreement. This has resulted 
in additional concerns over the implications for 
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege that 
may be weakened by the presence of such third-
parties within the companies.145 
 In response to recent criticism associated with 
the use of corporate monitors in the resolution 
of enforcement actions, on March 7, 2008, the 
DOJ issued a memorandum setting forth nine 
principles to guide the use of monitors in de-
ferred and nonprosecution arrangements.146 The 
memorandum, titled “The Selection and Use of 
Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
and Non-Prosecution Agreements With Corpora-
tions,” provides guidelines to be followed when 
selecting a monitor and defining the terms of a 
monitor arrangement. It also makes clear that the 
guidance is considered by the DOJ to be “practical 
and flexible,” and will often vary giving the facts 
and circumstances of each particular enforcement 
action (e.g., whether the company does not have 
an effective internal compliance program or has 
ceased operations in the area where the criminal 
misconduct occurred). The nine principles ad-
dress, in general (1) the qualifications to consider 
in selecting a monitor, (2) the independence 
of a monitor, (3) the monitor’s responsibilities, 
(4) the scope of the monitorship, (5) commu-
nication with the Government, (6) adoption 
or dispute of the monitor’s recommendations, 
(7) reporting of previously undisclosed or new 
misconduct, (8) the duration of the monitorship, 
and (9) termination. While the principles attempt 
to provide more uniformity with respect to the 
appointment of monitors and the scope of their 
arrangements, they still leave prosecutors with 
great discretion to carry out these obligations. It 
remains to be seen whether the new policies will 
inject transparency into the process and result in 
a more uniform application of this process.
Collateral Or Related Litigation
 In addition to the high fines and potential 
jail time that FCPA violators may face, compa-
nies may find themselves defending additional 
lawsuits brought by private parties. There has 
been an explosion recently in collateral civil 
litigation brought by angry shareholders of 
corporations charged with violating the FCPA. 
Typical cases generally include Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 10(b)147 securities fraud 
actions and shareholder derivative suits. For 
example, after settling an enforcement action 
totaling more than $2.95 million with both the 
SEC and the DOJ,148 FARO Technologies, Inc. 
settled a securities fraud class action lawsuit for 
$6.875 million. The complaint alleged that the 
company deliberately misrepresented informa-
tion regarding the adequacy of the company’s 
systems of internal controls and misreported 
critical financial information regarding FARO’s 
performance to artificially inflate the company’s 
stock price.149 Similarly, a Michigan public pen-
sion fund filed suit against BAE Systems alleging 
that BAE’s directors negligently and recklessly 
breached their fiduciary duties by allowing man-
agers to violate the FCPA.150 Titan Corp. also 
faced multiple suits from its shareholders after 
its FCPA enforcement actions became public.151 
These cases demonstrate that any “benefit” a 
company may realize in avoiding conviction 
and settling FCPA charges with the Government 
may still result in costly consequences. Once 
an FCPA enforcement action is made public, 
shareholders may seek redress for the penalties 
and reputational harm attributed to a company’s 
failure to prevent violations of the FCPA. 
■
GUIDELINES
							These Guidelines are intended to provide guid-
ance regarding FCPA compliance and enforce-
ment issues. They are not, however, a substitute 
for professional representation in any specific 
situation.
	 1. Draft and implement an FCPA policy that 
explains the Act’s requirements and defines its 
provisions. Require all employees involved with 
international transactions and accounting matters 
to certify that they have received and read a copy of 
 © 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
★    SEPTEMBER     BRIEFING PAPERS    2008    ★
1
the policy. The policy should be easy to understand 
and avoid the use of excessive legalese.
	 2. Establish a culture of compliance, making 
clear acceptable practices with respect to overseas 
activity, recordkeeping, and internal controls. 
A zero-tolerance policy towards noncompliance 
should be instituted and management should be 
clear about its commitment to FCPA compliance. 
	 3. Make the FCPA policy applicable to all 
company subsidiaries and their employees. All 
policy directives should control, even if a foreign 
subsidiary’s local law provides different require-
ments. Any discrepancy should be reported to 
company legal counsel. 
	 4. Institute an ethics “hotline” or other internal 
reporting mechanism and encourage employees 
to report any suspicious activities to the company 
compliance officer (or company legal counsel). 
Assure employees that there will be no reprisal 
if a violation or potential violation is reported. If 
possible, employees should be able to file reports 
anonymously. 
	 5. Expressly prohibit making any facilitat-
ing or “grease” payments without prior, written 
approval from company legal counsel. If a pay-
ment is approved by legal counsel, the company 
must ensure that it is properly recorded in the 
company books and records as a “facilitating 
payment.” 
	 6. Do not pay any “promotional expenses,” 
including the travel, lodging, or entertainment 
expenses of foreign officials without the prior, 
written approval of company legal counsel. 
Any trip involving a foreign official must have 
a legitimate business purpose and must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve this purpose. 
	 7. Carefully scrutinize all prospective busi-
ness relationships with foreign agents or rep-
resentatives. Due diligence must be thorough 
and well documented and reviewed by high-
level company officers or management. Any 
agreement executed between the company and 
intermediary must expressly require compli-
ance with the FCPA. 
	 8. Review all agreements with foreign inter-
mediaries frequently and carefully monitor all 
transactions executed under the agreement.
	 9. Be on the lookout for FCPA “red flags” at 
all times. 
	 1/	 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff). 
See generally Shaheen & Geren, “For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement 
Trends,” Briefing Papers No. 05-8 (July 
2005); Dyer, “Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act,” Briefing Papers No. 00-5 (Apr. 2000); 
Irwin, Katirai & Lorello, “Due Diligence & 
Compliance Risk Management Abroad 
for Government Contractors,” Briefing 
Papers No. 07-6 (May 2007); Goddard, 
“Business Ethics in Government Contract-
ing—Part I,” Briefing Papers No. 03-6 
(May 2003); Irwin, “Ethics in Government 
Procurement/Edition III,” Briefing Papers 
No. 99-8 (July 1999). 
	 2/	 Prepared Remarks of Alice S. Fisher, Ass’t 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, at the ABA 
Nat’l Inst. on the FCPA, Omni Shoreham 
Hotel, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 16, 2006) 
[hereinafter Fisher Remarks].
	 3/	 Statement of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey, 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Concern-
ing Oversight of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Jan. 30, 2008). 
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